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Esta dissertação discute a relação entre a compensação de executivos e os 
incentivos de risco sobre fusões e aquisições, ou seja, a influência que têm a respeito 
da conclusão de um acordo de fusão e aquisição (F&A). Eu sugiro, com base na minha 
revisão de literatura, que as componentes individuais da compensação dos executivos, 
que são à base de dinheiro ou capital próprio, têm um impacto positivo na conclusão 
de uma F&A. Além disso, eu sugiro que a compensação executiva tem uma influência 
positiva na diversificação corporativa.  A amostra usada na análise econométrica inclui 
2,581 fusões e aquisições concluídas entre 1995 e 2007. Os meus resultados suportam 
a hipótese de que as opções sobre ações induzem tomadas de risco e, portanto, têm 
uma influência positiva sobre a conclusão de F&A. As compensações através de bónus 
têm também um impacto positivo. No entanto, o salário está apenas positivamente 
relacionado quando em conjunto com outros elementos de compensação. Por outro 
lado, de acordo com os resultados obtidos, os planos de incentivo de longo-prazo são 
o oposto da respetiva hipótese, visto que o sinal obtido é negativo, e as ações restritas 
não têm uma relação com fusões e aquisições na maioria dos modelos estudados. Por 
fim, eu crio uma pequena amostra, cuja análise sugere que as compensações dos 
executivos das empresas com baixo nível de diversificação têm um crescimento mais 
elevado após uma F&A do que as empresas com maior nível de diversificação. Por 
isso, as empresas com baixo nível de diversificação, em comparação com as empresas 
de maior nível, têm maiores incentivos associados à compensação dos executivos para 
adotar uma estratégia de diversificação corporativa.  
 





This dissertation discusses the relationship between executive compensation and risk-
taking incentives on mergers and acquisitions, i.e. their influence in the completion of M&As. 
I hypothesise that the individual components of executive compensation which are either cash-
based or equity-based have a positive impact on M&As. Further, I expect executive 
compensation to have a positive influence on corporate diversification. My sample includes 
2,581 completed M&As between 1995 and 2007. My findings support the hypothesis that 
stock options induce risk-taking, and therefore, have a positive influence in the completion of 
M&As. Bonus compensation also has a positive influence, however salary it is only positively 
related when in combination with other individual compensation components. By contrast, 
long-term incentive plans go against what it is hypothesised and restricted stock has no 
relationship in most of the regressed models. Finally, after creating a small sample, I illustrate 
that compensation for executives from low diversified firms have a greater growth post-
acquisition than those from high diversified firms. Therefore, low diversified firms 
comparatively to high diversified firms have more incentives associated with executive 
compensation to adopt a corporate diversification strategy. 
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Mergers and acquisitions1 (M&A) have been a key strategic instrument in growth 
and value creation for decades. We can separate the M&A activity into six waves 
(Edgren and Martinson, 2012). The first (1897-1904) consisted of horizontal mergers2 
and began due to a need of economic expansion since there was a major technological 
and economic upheaval. The second wave (1916-1929) started because there was a 
need of economic recovery which resulted in the introduction of better antitrust laws, 
and subsequently, allowed for the emergence of vertical mergers3. The third wave was 
due to the rise of conglomerate mergers which occurs when firms in unrelated 
businesses merge in order to allow the firm’s growth and reduce the volatility of their 
revenues (1965-1969). The fourth wave (1981-1989) was comprised of congeneric 
mergers4, corporate raiding5 and hostile takeovers which was caused by the 
deregulation of financial markets. The fifth wave (1992-200) was because of the 
increase in cross-country mergers in a period where there was a strong economic 
growth. Finally, the sixth wave consisted of the use of private equity as a mean of 
payment and the high number of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) between 2003 and 2008. 
Hence, we can conclude that the main motivation for mergers and acquisitions is 
growth, and subsequently, creation of value, which can result from seeking 
improvements in firm performance (Erel et al., 2012). Other view is that mergers and 
acquisitions occur to lower costs, and yet increasing profit margins and shareholder’s 
wealth (Bradley et al., 1988). M&As are also important as a mean to increase market 
power (Röller et al., 20006), technology innovation, synergies (Bradley et al., 1988) 
and diversification (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994). Therefore, M&A 
has a major impact on firm performance. In fact, Healy et al. (1992) examine the post-
                                                          
1 A merger refers to the absorption of one firm by another, where the acquiring firm retains its identity 
and acquires all assets and liabilities of the acquired firm. After the merger, the acquired firm ceases to 
exist as a separate entity. A consolidation is like a merger, but an entirely new entity is created. 
2 A horizontal merger occurs between firms that operate in the same business, and since competition 
could be high, synergies and potential gains in the market share are a good motivation.  
3 A vertical merger occurs between two companies that operate at separate stages of the production 
process for a specific output to increase synergies and the operation efficiency. 
4 A congeneric merger is when two firms in the same business merge, but they produce different outputs. 
5 Corporate raiding occurs when an investor buys a high percentage of shares of one firm who is 
considered undervalued, and the investor by using its voting rights can lead the firm to better results. 




acquisition performance of merged firms using a sample of 50 large deals in US 
between 1979 and 1983. They find that the merged firms have significant 
improvements in asset productivity, and consequently, their operating cash flows 
grew.  
Further, it is globally accepted that firm performance also has a relationship with 
executive compensation (Murphy, 1999). Most of the executive compensation 
literature has focused on the relation between chief executive officers (CEOs) and 
shareholders’ wealth, e.g. Smith and Watts (1984) find that compensation plans are 
bonded to firm performance measured as stock’s returns. Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
discuss that CEOs with higher pay-performance sensitivity have more incentives to 
create wealth for shareholders. Murphy (1985) shows a positive relation between the 
compensation of top executives and firm sales’ growth. If the compensation contract 
is mostly bases on equity compensation, this one is highly tied to the firm’s stock 
return. However, executives might undertake managerial decisions that reduce firm’s 
risk to reduce their compensation risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), which would be prejudicial to shareholder’s wealth. Therefore, executives’ pay 
and shareholders’ interests should be aligned. Carpenter and Sanders (2002) suggest 
that top managers’ pay can positively contribute to firm performance if it is aligned 
with shareholders’ interests and key political and strategic contingencies that the firm 
has. Thus, we can conclude executive compensation can be an important variable in 
firm performance. For this reason, there is also a relation between M&A and executive 
compensation. One branch of literature about executive compensation associates it to 
how it affects managerial decisions such as investments, like acquisitions (Datta et al., 
2001) or policy choices (Coles et al., 2006). Datta et al. (2001) document a positive 
and significant relationship between acquiring executives’ equity-based compensation 
and stock price performance around and following acquisition announcements. Also, 
Bliss and Rosen (2001) demonstrate that executives’ compensation usually increases 
after bank mergers even though firm performance might diminish.  
This dissertation contributes to a long line of research on the motives for 
completing mergers and acquisitions deals through executive compensation and risk-
taking incentives. My sample consists of 2,581 unique M&A deals that were 
completed between 1995 and 2007 and I use a logit regression model to conduct my 
main set of analyses. Similar to previous literature, I find that bonus compensation and 
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stock options compensation are significantly and positively related to the managerial 
decision to complete a M&A. Other results show that contrary to previous studies, 
there is no relation between risk-taking incentives and investment decisions like M&A. 
Moreover, my third hypothesis that refers that equity-based compensation has a 
positive relationship with the completion of M&As only partly holds, since not only 
long-term incentives plans are negatively related to it restricted stock coefficient is 
only positive and statistically significant when I regress with all main independent 
variables (risk-taking incentives and all compensation components). 
My research is complemented with a small sample qualitative analysis. Using a 
subsample of 24 firms from the manufacturing and financial industry I look for 
evidence if firms increase their executives’ compensation as a result of corporate 
diversification. Results seem to indicate that executives from low diversified 
companies have more incentives to diversify than those from high diversified firms.  
This dissertation proceeds as follows. In section 2, I discuss relevant literature on 
executive compensation and risk-taking incentives in the completion of mergers and 
acquisitions. Five hypotheses are presented. In section 3, I explain my data sample 
selection as well as the results of econometrical analysis. In section 4, I come forward 
with empiric evidence on the fifth hypothesis suggest, with accompanying analysis of 




2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
To allow a discussion on the impact of executives’ compensation and risk-taking 
incentives in mergers and acquisitions, I first review the relevant academic literature 
to examine their relationship. Secondly, I revise the literature about the main 
independent variables, which are the executive compensation components and the 
proxy used for risk-taking incentives. This literature review will guide my 
econometrical analysis. Finally, I review the literature on corporate diversification and 
how executive compensation is linked to it. Within the analysis of the related literature, 
I develop and present five hypotheses. 
M&As are assumed to be important investment decisions. A significant part of 
the academic literature examines how the incentives provided through compensation 
schemes affect managerial decisions, and subsequently, firm performance. When 
managerial effort cannot be observed there should be a link between executives’ 
compensation and a proxy for effort which is usually a measure of firm performance 
(Holmstrom, 1979). Indeed, the principal-agent model explains how shareholders 
should bond executives’ pay to firm performance, so that they have incentives to 
increase firm’s value and overcome agency costs (Holmstrom, 1979; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Smith and Stulz (1985) support that if managers do not have 
incentives via their compensation structure, they may forgo positive net-present-value 
(NPV) projects that would increase firm risk. This issue is worse with firms that have 
considerable growth opportunities (Guay, 1999). Likewise, Low (2009) finds that 
managerial risk aversion is a severe agency problem which leads managers to 
managers reducing firm risk at the cost of shareholders’ wealth. For this reason, Smith 
and Watts (1992) defend that under these circumstances, managers’ wealth is expected 
to be linked to firm performance to avoid it. Jensen and Murphy (1990) have evidenced 
that the pay-performance sensitivity (delta) in managerial compensation contracts is 
too low to provide managers with significant incentives to act accordingly to 
shareholders’ interests. However, Hall and Liebman (1998) argue that those values are 
understated and show that the pay-performance sensitivity in managerial 
compensation contracts rose in the 1990s due to the fast growth of lucrative and safe 
alternatives in the stock market such as stock options. 
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Furthermore, academic literature also focuses on how stock options induce risk-
taking. Amihud and Lev (1981) and Smith and Stulz (1985) debate that because 
managers have undiversified wealth tied to the firm, they might forgo positive NPV 
projects that would increase firm risk and provide benefits for shareholders. 
Nevertheless, shareholders can reduce this agency problem, and its respective costs, 
by structuring managers’ compensation as a convex function of firm performance, 
resulting in managers’ wealth increasing with the volatility of firm stocks return. Smith 
and Stulz (1985) and Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) show that executive compensation 
plans which are convex functions of firm value provide risk-taking incentives for 
managers. Similarly, Guay (1999) supports that the convexity of the manager’s wealth-
performance is positively related with risk-taking proxies, such as measures of growth 
opportunities and research and development (R&D) expenses. On the other hand, 
Lambert et al. (1991) and Amihud and Lev (1981) argue that undiversified and risk-
averse managers may become more risk averse if awarded with stock options.  
Empirical research suggests that the most common determinants of executive 
compensation are firm size and firm performance measured by the stock returns 
(Murphy, 1999). Murphy (1999) also highlights that firms set compensation by 
looking at the compensation their peers’ executives receive, and therefore size which 
can be increased by acquisitions is a determinant for which peer group they belong. 
To conclude, executive compensation is a significant determinant in terms of 
understanding how managers make their decisions, if it makes them more risk-averse 
or not, and their openness to laborious deals such as M&As. This line of research will 
be further developed in the following sections and in my subsequently empirical 
analysis.  
 
2.1 Risk-Taking Incentives 
Risk-taking incentives are important in executives’ compensation plans, since 
equity compensation exposes them to unsystematic risk, and thus risk-averse managers 
will seek ways to reduce firm’s risk, even if destroys value (Amihud and Lev, 1981; 
Low, 2009). Therefore, risk-taking incentives are important to align with shareholders’ 
interests (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Most authors such as Coles et al. (2006), Guay 
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(1999) and Low (2009) use vega7 as a measure for executives’ risk-taking incentives., 
except for Lambert et al. (1991) who use manager’s expected utility with respect to 
stock return volatility as a proxy for risk-taking incentives. Guay (1999) finds that 
stock’s return volatility is positively related to the convexity provided to managers, 
and for this reason convexity provides incentives that influence financing and 
investments decisions. Lambert et al. (1991) and Carpenter (2000) observe that stock 
options increase the convexity of executives’ payoff by increasing the sensitivity of 
executives’ wealth to changes in stock returns and increase the sensitivity of 
executives’ stock and options portfolio to a 1% increase in stock’s price (delta). Low 
(2009) provides evidence that risk reduction destroys value. So, high sensitivity of 
executives’ wealth to stock’s return volatility helps align risk-taking behaviour in 
accordance with shareholders’ interests, because most managerial decisions that 
decrease risk happen when vega or delta from companies’ managers are low. Also, the 
author refers that probable adverse effects that occur after legislation changes can be 
mitigated by high vega.  In addition, Guay (1999) finds that increased delta exposes 
managers to higher risk and increases executives’ risk-aversion, but high vega can 
balance it. These findings, support that equity incentives, essentially vega8, help 
overcoming managerial risk-aversion, which leads executives to reduce firm risk, as 
well as inducing risk-taking.  
Furthermore, the existence of risk-aversion can have big impact on managerial 
decisions, and consequently, managers could avoid risky projects with positive net 
present value (NPV), and therefore, equity-based compensation is known as a method 
to align managers’ interests to shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Smith and Stulz (1985) suggest that stock options compensation influences risk-taking 
behaviour due the value of stock options increasing as stock returns volatility 
increases. On the other hand, Carpenter (2000) discusses that if equity compensation 
can increase executives’ wealth sensitivity to stock returns volatility, then it does not 
mandatorily bring a higher risk-taking behaviour. So, I can conclude that there is a 
                                                          
7 Vega is the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to the volatility of stock returns. 
8 Most research focus on vega because delta as a proxy for CEOs pay-performance sensitivity has 
ambiguous effects, since high delta can lead to a greater CEO effort, and subsequently, they undertake 
riskier and positive NPV projects, but also because high delta expose them to higher firm-specific risk, 
and therefore increases risk-aversion (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
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relationship between risk-taking and executive compensation, although it is 
inconclusive if it is positive or negative.  
In the context of mergers and acquisitions and the impact risk-taking incentives 
on it, Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012) suggest that vega gives managers incentives 
to increase risk through corporate acquisitions, whereas Kini and Williams (2012) do 
not find a relationship between risky managerial decisions and risk-taking incentives 
provided by vega. Coles et al. (2006) present evidence of the relationship between the 
structure of executive compensation and managerial decisions (e.g. investment and 
policy choices) through risk-taking incentives that are vega controlled for delta. The 
authors find that higher prior vega implements riskier policy choices, such as more 
investment in R&D, less investment in property, plant and equipment (PPE), more 
firm focus9 and higher leverage. They also find that riskier policy choices lead to 
executive compensation with higher vega and lower delta. Moreover, M&As are risky 
investments because its net present value is uncertain and Datta et al. (2001) find that 
CEO’s risk-taking incentives affect firm’s long-term investment policies and assumes 
M&As as important corporate investment decisions. Therefore, it is plausible to 
conclude that risk-taking incentives influence the decision to complete a M&A deal. 
Following this line of research, I elaborate my first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Risk-taking incentives, controlling for executives’ pay-performance 
sensitivity, will have a positive impact on the managerial decision to complete 
M&As. 
 
2.2 Equity Compensation 
The typical shareholder is diversified, however, risk-averse and undiversified 
managers have their firm as the major source of risk in their portfolio, and 
consequently, they might forgo positive NPV projects who would increase firm risk, 
increasing the chances of destroying firm value, and therefore, stock awards and stock 
options are used to align executives’ incentive to shareholders’ interests to overcome 
risk-aversion and maximise firm value (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Jensen and 
                                                          
9 Higher firm focus is typically achieved by selling unrelated assets to other firms or by spinning off 
unrelated divisions (Comment and Jarrel, 1995). 
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Meckling, 1976). Lambert (1986) adds that lower observability of executives’ effort 
might increase agency costs, but increasing executives’ risk can mitigate those costs. 
He also suggests that compensation contracts highly based on cash flows can result in 
a misalignment of interests and even induce managers to overinvest in risky projects. 
So, an optimal amount of equity-based compensation is essential to monitor 
executives.  
 It is globally accepted that using stock options as compensation shields the 
managers from the downside risk because it can be used as a call option and it will be 
profitable when the stock’s price exceeds the strike price. Also, sometimes there is a 
vesting period before options can be exercised which might incentivise managers to 
take the long-term perspective in their decisions.  Also, equity-based compensation 
can influence managerial decisions by tying executives’ wealth to firm risk and 
performance (Guay, 1999), where the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to firm risk is 
captured by vega and might induce riskier investment choices that bring benefits due 
to the changes in stock’s return volatility they cause, while the sensitivity of 
executives’ wealth to firm performance is captured by delta and might induce 
executives to undergo value-enhancing decisions. Prior academic literature discusses 
how stocks and stock options provide incentives for risk-averse managers to prompt 
them to invest in risky projects on behalf of risk-averse shareholders (Guay, 1999; 
Hirshleifer and Suh, 1992; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Stulz, 1985) like 
acquisitions (Datta et al., 2001).  
Cohen et al. (2000) find that there is a relationship between an increase in 
managers’ stock options holdings and subsequent increases in firm risk. This is 
explained by the expected increase of stock options’ payoff associated with the stock’s 
return volatility (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) find that 
managers whose firms stock’s return volatility increased after an acquisition had more 
equity-based compensation which prompt them to undertake more high-risk 
investments and Sanders’ results (2001) suggest that stock options are positively 
related to the number of acquisitions made by the respective firms. Furthermore, Smith 
and Watts (1992) examine that growth opportunities within the firm difficult the 
alignment of interests between shareholders and managers. They find that firms with 
numerous investment opportunities tend to use more stock options as compensation to 
incentivise managers to maximise shareholders’ wealth by linking their wealth to firm 
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value. Later, Guay (1999) shows that incentives given by stock options are positively 
associated with firms’ investment opportunities. Datta et al. (2001) posits a positive 
relation between equity-based compensation from the firm’s top executives, measure 
as a percentage of total compensation, and the firm’s stock returns around the 
acquisition announcements and have evidence that stock returns’ volatility has greater 
changes post-acquisition. Based on this discussion, I conclude that there is a 
relationship between stock-options, risk-taking and firm performance, and therefore, I 
formulate my second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Stock options will display a positive relationship regarding the 
completion of a M&A deal. 
A significant part of literature focuses on compensation elements that have 
convex payoffs (e.g. Guay, 1999). One of those elements is stock options, but direct 
stock compensation, e.g. restricted stock10, can also add convexity (Core and Guay, 
1999). Even though restricted stock effects remain unclear, its usage has been 
increasing (Murphy, 2012), since they offer a long-term payoff and a limited vega. 
Long-term incentive plans usually comprise of stock options, restricted stock and 
performance plans. Restricted stock is related to the stock’s price, since executives 
receive common stock with restriction on sale with a vesting period to incentivise them 
to stay at the company, provides incentives for managers to improve firm performance 
at the expense of exposing their wealth, and consequently, might increase risk-aversion 
(Smith and Stulz, 1985). On the other hand, performance plans are related to rewards 
executives receive when they meet specific goals over the pre-determined period 
(Larcker, 1983). Also, stock options and restricted stock require no cash payout, so 
companies with any cash constraint could use these types of compensation as a 
substitute for cash (Core and Guay, 1999).  
Further, Chi and Johnson (2008) examined the relationship between restricted 
stock and corporate acquisitions. The authors find that longer holding periods of stock 
are positively tied to higher acquisition announcements and higher post-merger 
profitability, increasing shareholders’ wealth. These effects are explained by the fact 
that after long-term decisions (e.g. corporate acquisitions) are made, while having 
                                                          
10 It is an option that has a strike price of zero. 
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access to private information, and its results known, restricted stock incentives are 
beneficial. This research and findings induced me to infer my third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Restricted stock and long-term incentive plans will have a positive 
impact in the completion of a M&A deal. 
 
2.3 Cash Compensation 
Salary is a fixed compensation, and therefore its effects on manager’s effort and 
performance it is irrelevant. Moreover, salary only constitutes one part of executive 
compensation (Murphy, 2012). A bonus, another form of compensation, is a payoff 
that depends on manager’s performance, generating an indirect link between their 
wealth and shareholders’, aligning their interests. 
Guay (1999) and Core et al. (1999) debate that executives with higher cash 
compensation can invest more outside their firm, being more diversified, and 
consequently, less risk-averse. Prior literature also argues that firm size has a 
significant and positive relationship with CEO compensation (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Thus, executives might decide to proceed with a 
M&A deal to demand more (cash) compensation (Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Core et al., 
1999). Conyon and Gregg (1994) study the determinants of remuneration by analysing 
a sample with the highest paid CEOs from UK companies and their results is that 
acquisitions lead to a premium pay (e.g. bonuses). Grinstein and Hribar (2004) study 
CEO compensation for completing M&A deals. To examine the acquisition effect on 
CEO bonus, they use an Acquisition Dummy variable that equals one if the firm did 
an acquisition in that year which deal was worth at least $1 billion.  The subsequent 
econometrical analysis suggests that the acquisition dummy is significant and positive, 
implying that firms are willingly to pay higher bonuses if in doing so the business 
performance of the enterprise is measurably higher. Considering this, my fourth 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 4: Cash-based compensation, like salary and bonus, will display a 




2.4 Corporate Diversification 
Diversification is generally known as a corporate strategy to enter a new market 
or industry in which they do not operate. However, it can occur to increase growth 
opportunities, for more efficient usage of existing resources and capabilities in the 
current production processes, to either escape from unattractive industry 
environments, to increase market power in a desirable industry or make use of surplus 
cash flows. Even so, its main purpose is to maximise firm’s value, and therefore, the 
combined value of the firm after an acquisition has to be greater than the value of both 
firms prior to the acquisition which can be accomplished through synergies (Bradley 
et al., 1988).  Prior literature demonstrates that these synergies can be achieved by 
exploiting economies of scale that decreases unit costs with increases in production, 
by efficient allocation of capital or by exploiting economies of scope. Moreover, 
corporate diversification can increase debt capacity (Lewellen, 1971) and reduce firm 
risk (Comment and Jarrell, 1995). 
Prior literature focuses on how corporate diversification creates (destroys) firm’s 
value, the benefits managers gain and the agency costs created or intensified due to 
corporate diversification. Stein (1997) suggest that managers with private and superior 
information can better select investment decisions that increase firm value. Caves 
(1971) uses this assumption to justify geographical diversification. Kim and Lyn 
(1986) and Morck and Yeung (1991) provide evidence that geographical 
diversification and firm value have a positive relationship. Lang and Stulz (1994) and 
Denis et al. (2002) suggest otherwise, demonstrating that geographical diversification 
is associated with value destruction and Do Santos et al. (2008) discusses that only 
unrelated diversification destroys value, whereas related diversification is value-
enhancing which can be explained because of the accepted motive for related 
diversification being the potential economies of scope that arise when the total cost of 
producing two or more outputs is less than the sum of the cost by producing each 
output in a separate process. These previous authors also discuss that if firms merge 
or acquire “fairly value” international corporations where there is not a premium pay, 
they do not destroy value. Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) argue that diversification is 
caused by the relation between manager’s private benefits and the management of a 
diversified firm, and not by the effects it may have in the reduction of firm risk. So, 
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whether diversification is value-creating (Morck and Yeung, 1991) or value-
destroying (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Denis et al., 2002), the 
determinants that conduct managers to use corporate diversification strategies is 
unclear. Therefore, we will analyse executive compensation impact on this managerial 
decision based on M&A deals. 
Agency costs can arise when managers have incentives to take advantage of 
shareholders through diversification to increase their private benefits. One of those 
reasons could be more compensation as the latter is related to firm size (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990). Jensen (1986) suggests that managers which firms have excess cash 
flows expand more, increase the size of the firm they “control” so that they entrench 
as the firm requires their expertise (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Furthermore, Rose and 
Shepard (1997) examine the relationship between executive compensation and 
corporate diversification. They find that executives of diversified firms (with two 
distinct segments) receive, on average, a higher 13% salary and bonus than managers 
of undiversified firms. Amihud and Lev (1981) discuss that diversification drives 
executives to undertake M&A deals, and hence increasing their personal benefits, even 
if synergies are not positive (Thijssen, 2008). Therefore, diversification can be a strong 
determinant in M&A decisions. Following this prior literature, I will test the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5: High-diversified firms have, comparatively with low-diversified 




3. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, I test my hypotheses using a panel dataset and logit regression 
models. I begin by explaining my data sample, the variables I use and present their 
summary statistics. Next, I use regression models to test the validity of my developed 
hypotheses 1 to 4. Potential limitations of my research are also debated. 
3.1 Data Sample and Variables 
Information on M&As was collected from GSIOnline database11 from 1995 to 
2007. The start date (1995) and the end date (2007) are, respectively, the first and last 
year for which M&As data is available at the database. The database includes 64749 
M&A deals that were completed within the specific sample period. I then exclude 
38,318 duplicates in accordance to the merger number and 1,848 deals which 
transaction value is unknown. My final sample includes 24,583 M&As. 
To test the impact of executive compensation and risk-taking incentives regarding 
the completion of M&As we need data which I collect from Compustat ExecuComp12 
database as well as firm-specific data from Compustat13 database. Then, I merge all 
my data samples and construct my dependent variable, Deal Dummy, which takes the 
value 1 if an executive in a given firm and year completed a M&A deal or 0 otherwise. 
My final sample includes 2,581 unique M&A deals which were a result of managerial 
decisions from 15,913 managers and which respective firms are constituents of 63 
different industries based on the unique double-digit Standard Industry Classification 
(SIC) code within the sample period. 
I capture risk-taking incentives through vega, which I define as the as the change 
in dollar value of executive’s wealth for a 1% change in the volatility of stock returns. 
It is computed accordingly to how Guay (1999) does, which is based on the Black-
Scholes’s (1973) method for the option valuation, modified to account for dividend 
                                                          
11 Mergers and Acquisitions database that cover changes in control transactions as well as significant 
acquisitions or sale of assets, equity, subsidiaries or business divisions. It is owned by Thomson Reuters 
and only comprises data between 1995 and 2007, which for more recent deals interested researchers 
should access Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum Database.  
12 Database that has data on executive compensation for S&P 1000 firms from 1992 to present. 
13 Database that contains fundamental financial and price data for publicly US traded companies from 
1950 to present. 
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payout by Merton (1973). Next, I follow Hayes et al.’s (2012) method to compute the 
yearly proportions of dollar compensation which will be used to capture executive 
compensation incentives. First, I compute the value of cash compensation as the sum 
of salary and bonus14. Afterwards, I add the value of current options, current restricted 
stock and current long-term incentive plans to obtain the yearly total compensation. 
Finally, I compute the compensation components in relation to the yearly total 
compensation and obtain the proportion of salary (P(Salary)), proportion of bonus 
(P(Bonus)), proportion of stock options (P(Options)), proportion of restricted stock 
(P(RestrStock)) and the proportion of long-term incentive plans (P(Ltip)). 
To account for possible endogeneity issues, where the independent variable might 
cause the dependent variable due to other omitted variables, I control for various firm-
specific information, to separate the effects of the compensation elements used as well 
of the risk-taking incentives. To control for one of my main dependent variables, vega 
(as a proxy for risk-taking incentives), I follow Coles et al. (2006) and include 
executives’ pay-performance sensitivity (delta), which I define as the sensitivity of 
CEO’s option value with respect to 1% change in stock price. Similar to other authors, 
I control for capital structure, investment opportunities, liquidity, policy measures, 
profitability and stock performance (e.g. Core et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2006). Prior 
literature debates that firm size has a positive relation with executive compensation, 
since by increasing firm size, executives can demand more compensation for managing 
a larger firm (Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Core et al., 1999). Also, Baker et al. (1988) find 
that executive compensation increases with firm size after an acquisition. Thus, I 
control for firm size15. Moreover, I include return on assets (roa) to control for 
profitability and book-to-market ratio for investment opportunities. I control for firm 
performance through sales growth as well as through stock’s return volatility 
(volatility). Also, I control for liquidity since it is important for the firm to meet its 
short-term financial obligations. Therefore, following Coles et al. (2006) and 
Anderson and Core (2012), I include surplus cash due to firms with high values of it 
are more likely to complete acquisitions (Jensen, 1986) and a dummy variable for 
liquidity constraint (liquidity). On the other hand, executive’s liquidity is important 
too, and therefore I include it in accordance with Anderson and Core (2012) who 
                                                          
14 Bonus= bonus + non-equity incentives  
15 I utilize the variables logarithm of sales and logarithm of total assets 
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define it as the proportion of executive’s cash compensation to non-cash compensation 
(executive liquidity). Furthermore, I control for firm policies since they can change 
firm risk (Coles et al., 2006). For this reason, I include diverse firm policy variables 
and proxies for growth opportunities such as leverage, R&D expenses, capital 
expenditures (capex) and PPE expenses (ppe). Finally, I also control for risk using the 
standard deviation of EBITDA/Total Assets (John et al., 2008). All variables’ 
information is the average of the 12 months to the completion date. Consistent with 
prior literature (Core and Guay, 1999; Guay, 1999), I winsorize all my variables at the 
1st and 99th percentiles.  
 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables: columns 1-3 for the 
pooled sample (mean, median and standard deviation), while columns 4-5 & 7-8 
present the mean and median for the subsample based on the value the dependent 
variable takes. Columns 6 and 9 test the significance for the differences in the means 
and medians. 
There are 5,624 managers who undertook the decision to complete a M&A deal. 
The lowest transaction value from my sample is the acquisition of US Based Managed 
Services Operations by the acquirer Bank One Corp (1.75 million) and the highest deal 
is the acquisition of Allegiance Corp by the acquirer Cardinal Health Inc (6,490 
million). The average deal was completed with a transaction of 508 million. 
On average, a typical executive receives 50.5% of total compensation in form of 
salary and 16.7% as bonus. Therefore, cash compensation consists of 67.2% of total 
compensation, whereas equity-based compensation comprises 32.8% with 26.7% 
regarding stock options compensation. Even though, there was a boom in the use of 
stock options (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Murphy, 2012), 30% of the executives from 
my sample do not receive any as pay (not tabulated). By contrast, other means of equity 
compensation such as restricted stock and long-term incentives are less used in 




Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
The table presents the descriptive statistics of the data sample used. The sample comprises M&As completed 
between 1995 and 2007, which was split in two subsamples depending on the value the dependent variable takes. 
I do a T-test for the difference in the means and a Wilcoxom test for the difference in the medians. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  
 Total Sample M&A  No Deal   M&A  No Deal   
 (N=33,509) (N=5,624) (N=27,885) 
 (N=5,624) (N=27,885)   
 Mean Median Std. Mean Mean   Median Median   
Dependent Variable              
Deal Dummy 0.122 0 0.327 1 0 - 1 0   
Independent Variables              
Vega ($000s) 49,153 12,017 143,035 74,075 45,692 *** 16,633 11,566 *** 
P(Salary) 0.405 0.346 0.275 0.372 0.410 *** 0.307 0.350 *** 
P(Bonus) 0.167 0.123 0.178 0.169 0.166 *** 0.127 0.123   
P(Options) 0.267 0.169 0.296 0.285 0.265 *** 0.183 0.166 *** 
P(RestrStock) 0.130 0 0.223 0.147 0.127 *** 0 0 *** 
P(Ltip) 0.031 0 0.115 0.027 0.032  0 0 *** 
Control Variables           
   
Delta ($000s) 17,935 2,546 58,606 28,895 16,412 *** 3,419 2,472 *** 
R&D 0.028 0 0.076 0.031 0.028  0.000 0.000 *** 
Capex 0.055 0.044 0.061 0.054 0.055  0.040 0.045 *** 
PPE 0.267 0.210 0.236 0.228 0.272 *** 0.141 0.219 *** 
Leverage 0.240 0.222 0.202 0.234 0.240 *** 0.229 0.221   
ROA 0.084 0.037 1.676 0.027 0.092  0.037 0.037   
Firm size 7.820 7.663 1.840 8.352 7.750 *** 8.075 7.620 *** 
Book-to-market ratio 0.660 0.654 0.270 0.635 0.663 *** 0.645 0.657 *** 
Risk 0.044 0.024 0.113 0.053 0.043 *** 0.267 0.024 *** 
Executive liquidity 0.493 0.49 0.259 0.465 0.497 *** 0.466 0.500 *** 
Liquidity 0.101 0 0.301 0.075 0.104 *** 0 0 *** 
Deal size ($millions) - - - 508 - -      
Log(sales) 7.347 7.342 1.644 7.643 7.301 *** 7.514 7.303 *** 
Other characteristics           
   
Volatility 0.430 0.3691 0.227 0.425 0.430 *** 0.357 0.371 *** 
Sales growth 0.002 0 0.665 0.093 -0.011 *** 0.000 0.000 *** 
Surplus cash 0.099 0.099 0.117 0.102 0.099 *** 0.097 0.100 *** 
 
since the typical executive receives 13% of pay as restricted stock and 3.1% as long-
term incentives plans. In terms of the subsamples’ values, compensation components 
are statistically different, except for long-term incentive plans, but economically 
speaking they have similar values, where the biggest difference is the prior proportion 
of salary received that it is 3.8% greater for executives’ that completed a M&A deal. 
From the descriptive statistics, it is observable that for 1% change in the stock’s 
return volatility executive’s wealth either increases or decreases $49,153, while for 1% 
change in stock’s price executives’ stock options value increases or decreases $17,935. 
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Regarding my subsamples, although no conclusion can be drawn without an 
econometrical analysis, these observable values are in accordance with my first 
hypothesis, as executives from firms that completed M&As have prior high vega 
($74,075) which it is also consistent with existing literature (e.g. Armstrong and 
Vashishtha, 2012; Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009). So, high vega should align risk-
taking behaviour in accordance with shareholders’ interests (Low, 2009). Moreover, 
prior executives’ pay-performance sensitivity is higher for executives that completed 
M&As, which goes in line with Jensen and Murphy (1990) who discuss that higher 
pay-performance sensitivity provides incentives to maximise shareholders’ value. 
In relation to firm-specific characteristics, firms that completed M&As, 
comparatively to firms who did not, have prior higher firm size (both log(sales) and 
log(total assets)), sales growth and risk. However, they have economically lower return 
on asset, which could be a reason for undertaking M&As as the assets acquired could 
bring potential economies of scale or scope, less liquidity, and lower PPE expenses. 
As previously reviewed, academic literature usually uses PPE expenses, R&D 
expenses and capital expenditures as proxies to capture variation in firms’ investments 
and growth opportunities, and therefore, it is visible that prior to the M&A deal, firms 
had a low number of them.  
 
3.3 Multivariate Analysis  
 To test the hypotheses that I developed I use logit regression models, since my 
dependent variable is binary (only takes the values 1 and 0), my aim should be to find 
out which determinants (explanatory variables) cause the explained variable to take on 
those values. In this situation, an OLS regression model, even if controlled for fixed 
effects, would not be the most suitable method to test my hypotheses due to the fact 
that my data sample might suffer from heteroskedasticity, so the resulting t-statistics 
would be biased and would not constrain the predicted values to lie between 0 and 1, 
the latter which I tested and found the existence of values below zero. Therefore, I test 
my hypotheses using logit regression models and it is computed through the following 
equation: 
Pr(Y = 1|X1,...,Xk) = F(β0 + β1 · X1 + ...+ βk · Xk) 
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Where F(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the logistic 
distribution defined as F(x)=1/(1+exp{-x}), and the logit coefficients and the 
respective standard errors are estimated by the maximum likelihood technique. 
Moreover, I control my logit regression models for industrial and yearly fixed effects. 
Columns 1-7 of Table 2 present the results of the respective regression models. I 
regressed them using different components of executive compensation (and its 
respective proportions to the total compensation) and risk-taking incentives’ proxies: 
(1) vega, (2) salary, (3) bonus, (4) stock options, (5) restricted stock, (6) long-term 
incentive plans and (7) all main explanatory variables. 
In the context of risk-taking incentives, the coefficients in model (1) and (7) in 
Table 2 suggest that prior vega, controlled for executives’ pay-performance sensitivity, 
does not display a relationship regarding the completion of M&As. This is inconsistent 
with my first hypothesis as well as most existing literature on the subject (e.g.  
Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012; Coles et al., 2006; Guay, 1999) that suggests a 
positive relation between vega and undertaking riskier managerial decisions like 
acquisitions (Datta et al., 2001). However, it is in line with Kini and Williams (2012) 
who do not find a relationship between risky managerial decisions and risk-taking 
incentives captured by vega. So, this results might indicate that executives’ incentives 
are different from risk-taking incentives on financial and investment decisions. 
Regarding the executive compensation incentives, there is a noticeable relation 
towards M&As. Bonus compensation has a strong and positive impact on the 
probability of completing a M&A deal since it is associated to a predicted increase of 
0.91 percentage points in model (4) in the log-odds of the dependent variable and an 
increase of 1.761 percentage points in the log-odds of the explained variable when all 
main independent variables are considered. These results are consistent with Grinstein 
and Hribar (2004) which studied a sample of 327 large M&A deals between 1993 and 
1999, and concluded that 39% of the acquiring firms provide bonus compensation for 
the completion of a merger and acquisition deal. However, I note that salary has a 
negative relationship with the studied dependent variable which goes against the 
assumption that because of the relationship between compensation and firm size, 
executives might demand higher cash compensation after completing a M&A (Bliss 
and Rosen, 2001; Core et al., 1999; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One reason for this 
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Table 2  Logit Regression of Deal Dummy on Executive Compensation and Risk-Taking Incentives  
The table summarises the regression results for 7 models using different components of executive compensation 
and risk-taking incentives in addition to various independent variables. The dependent variable is Deal Dummy. I 
estimate the regression using fixed effects logit models, and thus, fixed effects for industry and year are included. 
The intercept is not tabulated. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable = Deal Dummy 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   
Vega 0.0001 
           0.0001  
 (0.97) 
           (1.17)  
P(Salary) 
  -0.596 ***         0.563  
 
  (-3.22)          (1.83)  
P(Bonus) 
    0.911 ***      1,761 *** 
 
    (3.71)        (4.66)  
P(Options) 
      0.290 ***     1.279 *** 
 
      (3.08)      (4.70)  
P(RestrStock) 
        0.018    1.152 *** 
 
        (0.11)    (3.37)  
P(Ltip) 
          -1.058 *** -1.069 *** 
 
          (-3.36)  (-3.38)  
Delta 0.0002 
 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  
 (0.75) 
 (0.37)  (0.38)  (0.37)  (0.39)  (0.38)  (0.34)  
R&D 3.029 *** 2.856 *** 2.958 *** 2.894 *** 2.997 *** 2.998 *** 2.891 *** 
 (4.27) 
 (4.00)  (4.19)  (4.07)  (4.22)  (4.22)  (4.05)  
Capex 6.028 *** 5.995 *** 5.821 *** 6.130 *** 6.057 *** 5.922 *** 5.676 *** 
 (6.24) 
 (6.20)  (6.05)  (6.33)  (6.28)  (6.18)  (5.86)  
PPE -2.265 *** -2.341 *** -2.300 *** -2.281 *** -2.266 *** -2.207 *** -2.322 *** 
 (-5.21) 
 (-5.39)  (-5.30)  (-5.25)  (-5.22)  (-5.10)  (-5.35)  
Leverage -0.870 *** -0.864 *** -0.861 *** -0.867 *** -0.875 *** -0.873 *** -0.863 *** 
 (-3.25) 
 (-3.20)  (-3.20)  (-3.23)  (-3.26)  (-3.25)  (-3.19)  
ROA 0.543 * 0.504 
 0.545 * 0.528  0.548 * 0.539  0.470  
 (1.65) 
 (1.50)  (1.66)  (1.57)  (1.67)  (1.63)  (1.42)  
Firm size 0.356 *** 0.340 *** 0.336 *** 0.362 *** 0.354 *** 0.361 *** 0.339 *** 
 (5.02) 
 (4.79)  (4.75)  (5.09)  (4.99)  (5.09)  (4.77)  
Book-to-market 
ratio 
-1.125 *** -1.107 *** -1.130 *** -1.089 *** -1.105 *** -1.093 *** -1.129 *** 
 (-4.81) 
 (-4.74)  (-4.84)  (-4.65)  (-4.73)  (-4.68)  (-4.81)  
Risk 0.808 
 0.807  0.813  0.897 * 0.824  0.789  0.732  
 (1.49) 
 (1.48)  (1.50)  (1.65)  (1.52)  (1.46)  (1.33)  
Executive liquidity -0.393 ** -0.094 
 -0.810 *** -0.245  -0.363 ** -0.329 ** -0.308  
 (-2.42) 
 (-0.52)  (-3.99)  (-1.41)  (-1.99)  (-2.03)  (-1.24)  
Liquidity 1.046 *** 1.049 *** 1.017 *** 1.039 *** 1.046 *** 1.030 *** 1.018 *** 
 (6.85) 
 (6.86)  (6.67)  (6.80)  (6.85)  (6.75)  (6.63)  
Log(sales) 0.090 
 0.088  0.085  0.084  0.086  0.087  0.093  
 (1.28) 
 (1.26)  (1.22)  (1.21)  (1.23)  (1.24)  (1.33)  
Volatility -0.071 
 -0.113  -0.029  -0.154  -0.059  -0.056  -0.148  
 (-0.43) 
 (-0.68)  (-0.18)  (-0.90)  (-0.36)  (-0.34)  (-0.86)  
Sales growth -0.013 
 -0.009  -0.010  -0.012  -0.009  -0.013  -0.016  
 (-0.24) 
 (-0.16)  (-0.18)  (-0.21)  (-0.17)  (-0.23)  (-0.28)  
Surplus cash 0.572 
 0.603  0.472  0.611  0.562  0.527  0.521  
 (1.05) 
 (1.10)  (0.87)  (1.12)  (1.03)  (0.97)  (0.95)  
Obs. 33,509   33,509   33,509   33,509   33,509   33,509   33,509  
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negative relation could be the fact that because of executives “only receive” salary 
compensation, accordingly to model (2), they are averse to risky projects, since they 
do not provide private benefits and it could increase the safety of their current position. 
However, in model (7) it is positive, although weakly significant, proving that a good 
mix of compensation can mitigate agency costs. So, can draw a conclusion from both 
models, which is that my fourth hypothesis holds, since cash-based compensation has 
a positive impact on the managerial decision to complete a M&A deal. 
The coefficients for stock options compensation in model (4) and (7) in Table 2 
imply that stock options affect positively the managerial decision to complete a M&A 
deal. This is consistent with my second hypothesis and prior literature previously 
discussed, and hence stock options do induce risk-taking behaviour, pushing managers 
to overcome the existent agency problems and adopting managerial decisions that 
could maximise firm value even at the cost of increasing firm risk (e.g. Guay, 1999; 
Hirshleifer and Suh, 1992; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Stulz, 1985). In 
addition, the respective coefficients for the restricted stock and long-term incentive 
plans differentiate from my third developed hypothesis that state that these 
compensation elements would have a positive impact on M&As. In fact, my 
econometrical analysis shows no relationship between restricted stock and the Deal 
Dummy if it is the main independent variable, but has a positive relation if all main 
variables are regressed in the same model (7). By contrast, long-term incentives plans 
are negatively related in both models. 
Coles et al. (2006) and Guay’s (1999) results demonstrate that R&D expenses and 
capital expenditures have a positive relation to risk-taking and investment decisions, 
while Coles et al (2006) adds that high leverage induces riskier decisions.  Indeed, my 
results demonstrate that firms’ investments as well as growth opportunities, captured 
by within the firm have a strong impact in the completion of M&As, and subsequently, 
in firm performance because companies with various investment opportunities tend to 
use more stock options to link managers’ wealth to firm value (Smith and Watts, 1992), 
and therefore, undergo managerial decisions beneficial for shareholders and that could 
maximise value. However, I note that leverage does not have a positive relationship, 
but a negative one, probably because leverage is known for the creation of cash 
constraints, and M&As usually use as a form of payment a mix of cash and stock-
based compensation (Martin, 1996). The reason could be due to companies interested 
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in completing a M&A deal typically have limited cash (10,2% of surplus cash) and 
liquidity (7,5%),  as tabulated in Table 1, the latter which is highly significant and 
positive in my models illustrated in Table 2, they have to obligatory resort to debt 
financing to do the payment related to cash, and thus, impairing the firms as they might 
not be able to choose an optimal  trade-off between equity and debt financing, so that 
the benefits are equal to the costs. 
Columns 1-6 of Table 3 present the results of the respective regression models. I 
regressed them using different mixtures of compensation elements: (1) proportion of 
fixed compensation (P(fixed)), (2) proportion of variable compensation, which is a 
sum of bonus and equity-based compensation, (3) both variables used in models 1&2, 
(4) cash compensation, (5) restricted stock and long-term incentive plans, (6) equity-
based compensation. 
In relation to the differences between fixed and variable compensation, if I only 
regress the fixed variable, its relationship is negative, which is to be expected as it 
increases managers’ risk aversion (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It also has negative 
effects on the Deal Dummy if I only consider cash compensation. Nonetheless, in the 
present of a compensation contract based on diverse types of compensation, salary can 
have a slightly positive impact, which effect could be caused by causality between 
explanatory variables, since prior literature focused on equity-based compensation, 
and more specifically stock options, argues that by connecting executives’ pay to firm 
performance through stock awards and stock options, they overcome agency costs and 
are have incentives to risk-taking decisions (Holmstrom, 1979; Smith and Stulz, 1985; 
Smith and Watts, 1992). The latter statement is also supported by my coefficients 
present in model (6) which is based on equity-based compensation, since stock options 
have a great significance and positive impact in the completion of M&As, although 
long-term incentive plans’ coefficients in both models 5&6 are negative, but the 
former is typically 26,7% of total compensation, while the latter is 3,1%, and thus, its 






Table 3 Logit Regression of Deal Dummy on Combinations of Executive Compensation Components 
The table summarises the regression results for 6 models using different mixes of components of executive 
compensation in addition to various independent variables. The dependent variable is Deal Dummy. I estimate the 
regression using fixed effects logit models, and thus, fixed effects for industry and year are included. The intercept 





Dependent Variable = Deal Dummy 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
P(Variable)   0.920 *** 1.352 ***       
 
  (5.15)  (4.16)  
 
     
P(Salary) or P(Fixed) -0.596 ***   0.558 * -0.465 **     
 (-3.22) 
 
  (1.73)  (-2.45)      
Total Compensation       
 
     
 
  
    
 
     
P(Bonus)       0.769 ***     
 
  
    (3.03)      
P(Options)       
 
   0.369 *** 
 
  
    
 
   (3.00)  
P(RestrStock)       
 
 -0.094  0.185  
 
  
    
 
 (-0.6)  (0.88)  
P(Ltip)       
 
 -1.103 *** -0.959 *** 
 
  
    
 
 (-3.43)  (-2.92)  
Delta 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  
 (0.37) 
 (0.39)  (0.37)  (0.38)  (0.39)  (0.37)  
R&D 2.856 *** 2.938 *** 2.903 *** 2.855 *** 3.068 *** 2.899 *** 
 (4.00) 
 (4.11)  (4.06)  (4.03)  (4.32)  (4.06)  
Capex 5.995 *** 5.99 *** 5.788 *** 5.805 *** 5.93 *** 5.982 *** 
 (6.20) 
 (6.17)  (6.00)  (6.02)  (6.15)  (6.21)  
PPE -2.341 *** -2.368 *** -2.313 *** -2.348 *** -2.231 *** -2.230 *** 
 (-5.39) 
 (-5.43)  (-5.33)  (-5.41)  (-5.13)  (-5.14)  
Leverage -0.864 *** -0.874 *** -0.868 *** -0.857 *** -0.881 *** -0.868 *** 
 (-3.20) 
 (-3.24)  (-3.21)  (-3.17)  (-3.28)  (-3.23)  
ROA 0.504  0.495  0.470 *** 0.510 
 0.532  0.511  
 (1.50) 
 (1.48)  (4.42)  (1.54)  (1.61)  (1.53)  
Firm size 0.340 *** 0.341 *** 0.345 *** 0.327 *** 0.365 *** 0.366 *** 
 (4.79) 
 (4.81)  (4.87)  (4.62)  (5.14)  (5.14)  
Book-to-market ratio -1.107 *** -1.121 *** -1.107 *** -1.126 *** -1.104 *** -1.078 *** 
 (-4.74) 
 (-4.79)  (-4.73)  (-4.82)  (-4.72)  (-4.61)  
Risk 0.807  0.754  0.694  0.799  0.763  0.826  
 (1.48) 
 (1.38)  (1.26)  (1.47)  (1.39)  (1.51)  
Executive liquidity -0.094  -0.095  0.554  -0.528 ** -0.382  -0.069  
 (-0.52) 
 (-0.52)  (0.30)  (-2.26)  (-2.09)  (-0.29)  
Liquidity  1.049 *** 1.051 *** 1.032 *** 1.026 *** 1.027 *** 1.030 *** 
 (6.86) 
 (6.85)  (6.73)  (6.71)  (6.71)  (6.74)  
Log(sales) 0.088  0.089  0.091  0.087  0.087  0.087  
 (1.26) 
 (1.27)  (1.30)  (1.26)  (1.24)  (1.24)  
Volatility -0.113  -0.128  -0.135  -0.071  -0.090  -0.136  
 (-0.68) 
 (-0.77)  (-0.82)  (-0.43)  (-0.54)  (-0.80)  
Sales growth -0.009  -0.008  -0.012  -0.009  -0.013  -0.014  
 (-0.16) 
 (-0.14)  (-0.21)  (-0.17)  (-0.23)  (-0.25)  
Surplus cash 0.603  0.579  0.545  0.518  0.506  0.587  
  (1.10)  (1.06)   (0.99)   (0.95)   (0.93)   (1.08)  
Obs. 33,509   33,509   33,509   33,509   33,509   33,509   
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3.3.1 Model Limitations 
Although I provide evidence to either accept or reject my developed hypotheses, 
there might be reasons for such results. Firstly, my data sample might have a selection 
bias, since when I merge my mergers and acquisitions data with the information related 
executive compensation and firm-specific characteristics.  Secondly, my results could 
have endogeneity problems, i.e. my findings might be affected by reverse causality, 
which would be a bias towards the coefficient estimates I obtain. Further, it is difficult 
to distinguish whether firms with a particular compensation structure provide more 
incentives respecting the completion of M&As or if the completion of M&As induces 
firms to pay differently percentages of compensation elements.  
Even if it is difficult to fully eliminate endogeneity issues, future research using 
advanced econometric models could reduce the probability that my results are 
endogenous. For example, such model could follow Hayes et al. (2012) and observe 
the relationship between compensation elements and risk-taking following an 




4. Small Sample Analysis 
This section examines the relationship between corporate diversification and 
executive compensation which prior literature suggests there is. Aggarwal and 
Samwick (2003) argue that diversification is caused by the relation between manager’s 
private benefits and the management of a diversified firm, and thus agency costs arise 
as they increase the benefits at the expense of stockholders. Moreover, firm size has a 
relation with executive compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) and Jensen (1986) 
suggests that managers use their companies’ surplus cash to expand and increase firm 
size so increase their chances of entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), increasing 
even more their benefits. Further, Rose and Shepard support the relationship between 
executive compensation and corporate diversification, since they find diversified 
companies receive more cash compensation that undiversified firms. 
 I begin by explaining my data sample and how I will capture the level of 
diversification for each firm. Next, I present the summary statistics of the components 
of executive compensation from the sample’s firms and draw conclusions regarding 
my fifth hypothesis which proposes that high diversified firms have, comparatively 
with low diversified firms, more compensation incentives for managers to adopt 
corporate diversification strategies. Then, I review the Definitive Proxy Statements 
from the financial year the deals were completed for the chosen firms.  
 
4.1 Data, Description and Analysis 
For my small sample analysis, I randomly16 chose 24 firms (see appendix 1), 12 
from the Manufacturing Industry and 12 from the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
Industry. 
 I select firms from the Manufacturing Industry because they must constantly 
improve its manufacturing process, which can be achieved through mergers and 
acquisitions, based essentially on product-market orientation, the latter which relates 
                                                          
16 I matched each firm from both selected industries with a number from 1 to the maximum value. Then 
I used a true random number generator programme to select them. 
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to diversification into businesses with similar production technologies and other 
characteristics that have potential economies of scope, they can (Bradley et al., 1988; 
Santos et al., 2003). On the other side, I select firms from the Finance, Insurance and 
Real Estate Industry because their reasons for M&As is globally accepted as to 
increase their customers and improve the efficiency of their operational infrastructures 
as they have more (skilled) employees. Moreover, it is widely known that financial 
firms, especially banks, have a greater level of regulation than manufacturing firms, 
playing an important role in corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), since 
executives have a higher difficulty to pursue personal objectives and have to align their 
interests with those of the banks, which typically have high leverage and have strong 
incentives to pursue risky investments such as loans or real estate investments, even if 
NPV is not positive17. Therefore, bank regulation is designed to take risk-taking 
incentives as well as compensation incentives. 
This small sample includes some established companies such as Emerson Electric 
Co, Esterline Technologies Corp and Pfizer Inc (all high diversified) or Capital One 
Financial Corp, Stifel Financial Corp and Western Digital Corp (all low diversified). 
To measure corporate diversification, I use a business count approach, which typically 
uses the lines of business based on the SIC code (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). Yet in my 
quantitative analysis I will measure it by the number of related M&As made by the 
respective selected firms. For this reason, I calculate the average number of related 
M&A deals completed by the selected companies within the specific period (1995-
2007). I split the sample in high diversified firms if they completed more deals than 
the mean sample (4.67; see appendix 1) and low diversified firms otherwise. My 
sample includes 112 M&As with 90% comprising of related diversification. 





                                                          
17 See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for more information about the risk-shifting incentives of equity-
aligned management in leveraged firms 
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Figure 1 Executive Compensation before and after a M&A deal 
The figure illustrates the average of the elements of executive compensation that managers receive, in average, 12 
months before and after the completion date. The X-Axis shows the respective elements of executive compensation. 
The Y-Axis has been adjusted to allow an easier interpretation. The sample includes a random selection of 24 firms 
who completed M&A deals between 1995 and 2007 (including financial and manufacturing firms only). 
 
Figure 1 shows the amount executives from my small sample received, in average, 
12 months before the completion date (t-1) and 12 months after (t+1). Overall, 
executive compensation soared after a merger and acquisition deal. Indeed, cash 
compensation increased 25.1% and equity-based compensation rose by 84.2%, with 
stock options contributing with a 60.1% increase, but the highest growth was from 
restricted stock and long-term incentive plans that grew by 98.7% and 117.6%, 
respectively. Moreover, it is visible that stock options are the favourite method to 
award executives (575 thousands, on average). On the other hand, bonus, restricted 
stock and long-term incentive plans have approximately similar values. Following the 
discussion in section 2.2, this could suggest that executive compensation increases 
with firm size (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990) and there might 
be incentives for managers to take advantage of shareholders through diversification. 














































Figure 2 Executive Compensation for Manufacturing and Finance, Insurance and Real Estate Firms 
The figure illustrates the average of the elements of executive compensation that managers receive, in average, 12 
months before and after the completion date. The X-Axis shows the respective elements of executive compensation. 
The Y-Axis has been adjusted to allow an easier interpretation. The sample includes a random selection of 24 firms 
who completed M&A deals between 1995 and 2007.The upper graph is related to manufacturing firms and the 
lower graph is for finance, insurance and real estate firms. 
 
 
Consistent with Houston and James (1995), who examine whether executive 
compensation in banking is structured to promote risk-taking or not. The authors find 
that, on average, CEOs receive less cash compensation and stock options 
comparatively to other industries. Although my results demonstrate that in the year 
prior to the M&A deal, executives from financial firms receive greater amount of 
bonus and long-term incentive plans, if I only take into consideration post-deal year, 












































































Figure 3 Executive Compensation for High and Low Diversified Firms 
The figure illustrates the average of the elements of executive compensation that managers receive, in average, 12 
months before and after the completion date. The X-Axis shows the respective elements of executive compensation. 
The Y-Axis has been adjusted to allow an easier interpretation. The sample includes a random selection of 24 firms 
who completed M&A deals between 1995 and 2007 (including financial and manufacturing firms only). The upper 
graph is related to high diversified firms and the lower graph is for low diversified firms. 
 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the difference in the executives’ pay between high and low 
diversified firms. The main finding is that high diversified companies receive more 
compensation either before or after the completion date except for long-term incentive 
plans, which low diversified companies receive 60 thousand more either before or after 
the deal. It is noticeable that low diversified companies have a greater growth for some 
elements of compensation such as bonus, stock options and restricted stock (56%, 
120% and 126%, respectively), whereas high diversified companies after a deal have 
a better jump in terms of salary (18.3%) and long-term incentive plans (135.7%).  












































































diversified firms have more incentives for diversification than low diversified firms, 
since it is noticeable that the latter has the highest benefits from diversifying, i.e. 
greater executive compensation growth post-deal.  
 
4.2 Definitive Proxy Statements 
To obtain the difference between contracts and awards that firms provide to its 
managers in respect to corporate diversification captured by M&As, I examine the 
detailed information provided by the Definitive Proxy Statements18.A contract 
typically includes cash-based compensation as well as equity-based compensation as 
previously debated. Nonetheless, some firms add some arrangements in case their 
targets are reached. An example of a compensation plan is the one from Stifel Financial 
Corp (2007):  
 “The key components of our executive compensation program are base salary, 
annual incentive compensation, long-term incentive compensation, merger-related 
compensation, and perquisites.” (Stifel Financial Corp, 2007, p.24) 
To align managers and shareholders’ interests, firms resort on compensation, 
usually, through stock options (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), allowing some control 
over managers, so that firm performance, and subsequently, firm value maximisation 
is their main objective. In fact, some companies award their managers for their effort 
and performance such as Emerson Electric Co (2007):  
“The Committee evaluates his performance and leadership, compares his pay to 
the median range of market compensation, and reviews his pay in relation to the pay 
of the other named executive officers. The Committee determined that Mr. Farr played 
a vital role in achieving this financial performance in fiscal 2007. His leadership was 
central to numerous accomplishments underpinning this performance, including: (…) 
Completing acquisitions that added to Emerson's technology base and to its products 
and customer services and solutions (…)” (Emerson Electric Co, 2007, p.51) 
                                                          
18 A proxy statement is a document with information that the Securities and Exchange Commission 




However, they do not always indicate the amount each compensation element is 
granted. By contrast, other corporations’ proxy statements cite such values. On the one 
hand, Hologic Inc (2007) and Pfizer Inc (2004) who communicate to their 
shareholders, increases in cash-based compensation in executives’ contracts: 
“Mr. Pekarsky received a commission-based bonus of $315,000. These bonuses 
reflected the extraordinary performance of the executives and the Company during 
fiscal 2006. Accomplishments during the fiscal year included (…) the completion of 
four strategic acquisitions during the year.” (Hologic Inc, 2007, p.) 
“The Committee considered management’s continuing achievement of its short 
and long-term goals versus its strategic imperatives, including Dr. McKinnell’s 
objectives which are as follows: (…) merger-related synergy goals; At the same time, 
the Company (…) achieved $3.6 billion in merger-related synergy savings. In April, 
2004, Dr. McKinnell began receiving a salary of $2,270,500, which reflected his 2003 
year-end merit increase.” (Pfizer Inc, 2004, p.49-50) 
On the other hand, some companies inform about increases in equity-based 
compensation:  
“(…) given the substantial favorable impact of the acquisition on Pfizer Inc. and 
its shareholders. Therefore, the Committee granted 502,380 shares of restricted stock” 
(Pfizer Inc, 2000, p.41) 
 “Performance Goals: All options and SARs granted under the 2007 Plan are 
designed to be exempt from the $1,000,000 deduction limit imposed by Code Section 
162(m). (…) the Committee must establish objectively determinable performance 
goals for the award based on one or more of the following business criteria, (…) 
business expansion (acquisitions)” (Torchmark Corp, 2007, p.7) 
So, the positive relationship between executive compensation and corporate 





This dissertation sheds some light on the executive compensation literature by 
focusing on incentives associated with executive compensation components and risk-
taking in the completion of M&As. Using multivariate regression models, I find that 
the individual elements of executive compensation influence differently the 
managerial decision to complete M&As. For this analysis, I use a sample of 2,581 
M&A deals that were decided by 15,913 executives and control for executives’ pay-
performance sensitivity as well as for firm-specific characteristics that have been 
proven to affect managerial decisions. On the one hand, I find that for the proportion 
of salary and the proportion of bonus in the executive compensation, I find a positive 
influence on M&A deals, while salary’s influence is negative, yet if I consider a model 
where I regress all compensation elements, salary has a positive but weakly significant 
positive impact in the completion of M&As. On the other hand, I find that the 
proportion of stock options has a positive impact on M&As. Although options are 
essentially used to overcome agency problems and induce risk-taking behaviour for 
managers to accept projects that could maximise firm value, in accordance to academic 
literature, risk-taking incentives captured by vega have no relationship in my large 
sample.  
Regarding restricted stock and long-term incentive plans, I expect a positive 
influence, based on my literature review. However, I find evidence for a negative effect 
of the long-term incentive plans and no relation for stock awards in the form of 
restricted stock, except for when all individual components are regressed in the same 
model that infers that it is positively related to the completion of a M&A deal.  
Using publicly available information for 24 firms between 1995 and 2008, I find 
evidence that corporate diversification captured by the number of mergers and 
acquisitions completed has a positive relationship with executive compensation by 
reading the definitive proxy statements. Further, my findings demonstrate that low 
diversified firms provide greater incentives for the completion of mergers and 
acquisitions than high diversified firms, which is opposite of what I hypothesised. 




Also, I cannot exclude the possibility that my findings suffer from endogeneity 
issues through reverse causality. For this reason, I put forward some suggestions for 
future research, which could further study the influence of compensation plans on 
M&As, especially in more recent years and find how to improve the contracts, so that 
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Appendix 1 Small Sample  
This table summarises the firms in my small sample. The sample includes a random selection of 24 firms from the 
manufacturing or financial, insurance and real estate industry between 2000 and 2004. I also include the respective 




Firms nº Deals Industry*
Amerigroup Corp 3 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
Bisys Group Inc 4 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
Capital One Financial Corp 4 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
Drew Industries Inc 7 Manufacturing 
East West Bancorp Inc 4 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
Emerson Electric Co 6 Manufacturing 
Esterline Technologies Corp 8 Manufacturing 
Fulton Financial Corp 10 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
Harmonic Inc 3 Manufacturing 
Hologic Inc 6 Manufacturing 
Intervoice Inc 3 Manufacturing 
Labranche & Co Inc 5 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
Loews Corp 4 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
Methode Electronics Inc 4 Manufacturing 
National City Corp 9 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
Northern Trust Corp 3 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
Pfizer Inc 6 Manufacturing 
Smith International Inc 5 Manufacturing 
SPX Corp 8 Manufacturing 
Stifel Financial Corp 3 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
Tektronix Inc 2 Manufacturing 
Torchmark Corp 1 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
UMB Financial Corp 2 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
Western Digital Corp 2 Manufacturing 
*according to the double-digit SIC code
Average 4,67
